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THE IRREDUCIBLE, MINIMAL MORALITY OF LAW: 
RECONSIDERING THE POSITIVIST/NATURAL LAW DIVIDE IN 
LIGHT OF LEGAL PURPOSE AND THE RULE OF LAW 
BRUCE P. FROHNEN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent scholarship has emphasized the extent to which the analytic divide 
separating legal positivism and natural law is less wide than previously 
portrayed.1 Indeed, it is worth revisiting questions regarding the analytic 
importance of the distinction between legal theories emphasizing the 
separation of law from morals and those tending to identify the two. The 
question is not whether morality “matters” in the sense of providing criteria for 
judging the goodness or evil of particular laws; clearly it does. The question is, 
rather, what difference it makes that, on the one hand, a legal positivist will say 
“it is law, but it is an immoral law so you, the citizen, should not obey it” and, 
on the other hand, the natural lawyer says “it is unjust and therefore not a law 
at all.” The answer, less than one might think, rests on an understanding of 
laws as intrinsically rooted in more general social institutions and, in 
particular, shaped by the intrinsic purposes of the rule of law. 
My premise is that questions regarding the connection between law and 
morals are best examined in light of the system or rule of law within which 
particular laws necessarily exist. I point, here, to no grand theory of law, but 
rather to the modest fact that the rule of law entails that laws, rather than 
particular persons, rule2 and that some rules are inconsistent with the rule of 
law, properly understood. Recognizing particular laws’ systemic context brings 
to our attention the fact that for laws to “work” they must have certain basic 
virtues (clarity, for example). Such recognition also highlights the intrinsic 
 
* Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University College of Law. Thanks to R.H. Helmholz of the 
University of Chicago Law School, J. Mark Ramseyer of the Harvard Law School, Edward C. 
Lyons of Oklahoma City University School of Law, Stephen C. Veltri, Interim Dean at ONU 
Law, and Rebecca Cronauer, ONU Law Class of 2013. 
 1. See, e.g., Leslie Green, Legal Positivism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Jan. 3, 2003), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entrie/legal-positivism. 
 2. RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 2 (2001) (“The classic conception of 
the rule of law is captured in the now-familiar language found in David Hume’s Essays and in the 
1780 Constitution of Massachusetts written by John Adams, both declaring the aspiration to ‘a 
government of laws and not of men.’”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
468 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:467 
purpose of law, namely maintenance of order and the intrinsically, though 
quite limited, moral nature of this purpose, providing peace and a certain 
predictability for human beings. 
Seen in the light of this overall purpose, both “soft” positivism and 
traditional natural law—seemingly quite disparate forms of legal theory—in 
fact share a highly constrained but real and irreducible moral element. Laws 
must be crafted well, possessing internal virtues, or they will not serve their 
particular functions (they fail as law), while also undermining the rule of law. 
Moreover, the very nature and purpose of the rule of law, being bound up with 
the provision of order, rules out laws aimed at extreme evil; such evil laws, as 
a practical matter, will lack the virtues necessary to any rule of law. The 
resulting conception of law, in keeping with both soft positivism and 
traditional natural law, properly understood, is neither so amoral nor so 
uncompromisingly moralistic as many on both sides of this divide may wish. 
Rather, it is one that recognizes a spectrum of law and law-likeness 
encompassing the possibility of many goals and of many levels of excellence 
or virtue, down to the nadir of lawlessness. 
Part I focuses on the work of H.L.A. Hart, arguing that his form of soft 
positivism has intimate connections with justice and morality. Part II examines 
critical texts in the natural law tradition to argue that the common view that, 
for natural lawyers “an unjust law is no law at all” fundamentally misstates the 
highly limited nature of the relationship between law and morality within that 
tradition. Part III extends the argument of Part I to show that soft positivism 
goes beyond mere connection with morality in that it, like most modern 
normative legal theory, is rooted in a particular conception of the good, namely 
individual autonomy. Part IV analyzes contemporary discussions of 
overlapping consensus and epistemic conceptions of law to show that this 
commitment to autonomy pervades the very “definition” of law today. Part V 
uses the concept of virtue to explain law’s irreducible but limited moral 
element as tied up with the intrinsic purpose of a rule of law—namely order, 
itself a moral good of a strictly limited nature. Part VI makes clear the moral 
nature of the rule of law as order by showing its incompatibility with great evil. 
The Article’s conclusion points out the limits of law’s ability to instantiate 
moral ends, given its own limited nature. 
I.  POSITIVISM: POWER—AND MORALITY 
Discussion of legal positivism may focus on the question of power. Does 
the mere fact that one holds the sovereign office make one’s commands into 
intrinsically valid laws? John Austin’s early positivist theory stated something 
like this, likening law to the command of an armed robber to hand over one’s 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2014] THE IRREDUCIBLE, MINIMAL MORALITY OF LAW 469 
money.3 Thus, in its most extreme form, positivism may be seen as equating 
law with power, arguably adding little to our understanding of either concept. 
As is well known, however, this is merely where the positivist (or at least soft 
positivist) study of law begins. H.L.A. Hart explains in The Concept of Law 
that the word “command” includes more than the raw expression of power 
involved in a mere “order.”4 Hart points out that the requirements for a 
command include a habit of obedience and hierarchy of authority, showing that 
a system or rule of law, unlike a particular, isolated demand, is a sophisticated 
construct of an advanced society.5 
Hart describes law as a system of primary and secondary rules—that is, 
direct commands requiring that persons do or abstain from certain acts, such as 
a criminal law forbidding murder, and rules laying out procedures for 
introducing, modifying, or applying primary rules.6 There must be actual order 
to these rules if they are to constitute a viable legal system: 
[A]ny method of social control . . . consists primarily of general standards of 
conduct communicated to classes of persons, who are then expected to 
understand and conform to the rules without further official direction. If social 
control of this sort is to function, the rules must satisfy certain conditions: they 
must be intelligible and within the capacity of most to obey, and in general 
they must not be retrospective . . . .7 
Hart discusses the requirements of systems of social control in purely 
functional terms—if people cannot know and obey the rules, those rules cannot 
function as guides to conduct and the ruler will fail to achieve any rational 
ends.8 The form of secondary rule relevant to legal systems is, of course, the 
rule of recognition.9 According to Hart, each state will have a rule of 
recognition under which those subject to laws will be able to recognize dictates 
that are to be treated as law.10 The rule of recognition for any given people 
may differ in the extreme, and its effectiveness rests explicitly on general 
acceptance that, say, a presidential signature is necessary to make a bill passed 
by Congress into a law.11 Law, on this view, is valid when it is enacted in 
accordance with accepted (as opposed to “moral”) rules, and the rule of 
recognition, actively upheld and applied by those sharing legislative power, is 
 
 3. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 6 (2d ed. 1994). 
 4. Id. at 19–20. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 94. 
 7. Id. at 206–07. 
 8. HART, supra note 3, at 94–95. 
 9. Id. at 95. 
 10. Id. 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
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accepted more or less passively by the general populace, who know little of its 
particulars.12 
Whether active or passive, such general acceptance leaves ample room for 
immoral laws. Hart denies that the rule of recognition has any intrinsic 
connection to morality.13 Moreover, on Hart’s reasoning even highly immoral 
laws should be seen as providing justification for a person’s actions.14 Thus, 
Hart condemns the German court’s decision in the famous Grudge Informer 
Case, in which a woman was convicted for unlawfully denying liberty to her 
husband by reporting him to authorities under a Nazi statute forbidding 
criticism of the regime.15 While the law and the woman’s actions both were 
immoral, Hart insists that the fact that the woman acted in accordance with the 
law rendered the conviction unwise.16 
But, in analyzing Hart’s putatively non-moral conception of law, we 
should consider why he deems the grudge informer’s conviction unwise. In 
effect, Hart criticizes the court for not taking the formal step of passing 
retroactive legislation to convict the grudge informer.17 Why was such a step 
needed? To make clear that punishing the woman’s immoral act, while morally 
imperative, nonetheless involved the regrettable sacrifice of “a very precious 
principle of morality endorsed by most legal systems,” namely, that an act’s 
legality is a crucial element in the determination whether to punish it.18 
“Most legal systems” endorse a “principle of morality.”19 Hart, here, is 
careful not to identify any legal system as by nature embodying a specific 
moral claim or dictate. After all, he is deeply concerned to oppose the blurring 
of legal and moral judgment.20 But his goal in so doing is to maintain the 
superiority of moral over legal judgment, with moral judgment properly 
guiding actions in regard to law. Hart makes this prioritization clear, for 
example, in stating that, once laws reach “a certain degree of iniquity” there is 
“a plain moral obligation to resist them and to withhold obedience.”21 Hart 
goes so far as to argue that the disintegration of some societies (for example 
those “mainly devoted to the cruel persecution of a racial or religious 
minority”) should be welcomed.22 Indeed, on Hart’s view, the very “principles 
 
 12. HART, supra note 3, at 116–17. 
 13. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 
626 (1958). 
 14. Id. at 618–19. 
 15. Id. at 619. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Hart, supra note 13, at 619–20. 
 19. Id. at 619. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 617. 
 22. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 19 (1963). 
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of legality” are to be “valued so far only as they contribute to human happiness 
or other substantive moral aims of the law.”23 Hart’s moral imperative is clear: 
“Law is not morality; do not let it supplant morality.”24 But what does this tell 
us about the moral status or content of law itself? Despite his concern to 
distinguish the two, it remains the case that, for Hart, law and morality are 
intimately associated. Firstly, Hart recognizes that justice is a relevant criterion 
to be used in evaluating laws; for Hart, “natural procedural justice,” or 
procedural due process, is a necessary means of achieving the legal imperative 
of treating like cases alike.25 Justice is a mere subset of morality26 and as such 
cannot determine the validity of rules any more than can morality itself. 
Further, we should remember that the very principles of legality are, in Hart’s 
view, “compatible with very great iniquity.”27 Nonetheless, according to Hart, 
“[T]he normal generality of law is desirable not only for reasons of economy 
but because it will enable individuals to predict the future and . . . this is a 
powerful contribution to human liberty and happiness.”28 Thus, while it is true 
that, for Hart, laws do not necessarily “reproduce . . . [the] demands of 
morality,”29 he recognizes that there is something “in the very notion of law 
consisting of general rules” which prevents us from treating it as lacking 
necessary contact with moral principles.30 
It would be too much to say that Hart explicitly recognizes law as a moral 
enterprise. According to Hart, a law can be both immoral and, because enacted 
in accordance with the rule of recognition, legally valid.31 He also explicitly 
states that a law’s validity tells the citizen nothing about whether it should be 
obeyed.32 But, as Jeremy Waldron has argued, examination of Hart’s work 
shows that, for him, there is “some criterial connection between legality and 
law” and “that principles of legality do have moral significance.”33 In addition, 
we should not lose sight of the fact that, in Hart’s schema, the rule of law itself 
holds the status of a high, ordering value.34 That is, the rule of law is more 
valuable than, and should guide us in judging the value of, any particular law.35 
 
 23. H.L.A. Hart, Book Review, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1291 (1965) (reviewing LON L. 
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964)). 
 24. Hart, supra note 13, at 618. 
 25. Id. at 624. 
 26. HART, supra note 3, at 157. 
 27. Id. at 207. 
 28. Hart, supra note 23, at 1291. 
 29. HART, supra note 3, at 186. 
 30. Hart, supra note 13, at 623–24. 
 31. Id. at 618. 
 32. See id. 
 33. Jeremy Waldron, Positivism and Legality: Hart’s Equivocal Response to Fuller, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135, 1168 (2008). 
 34. Hart, supra note 13, at 619. 
 35. Id. at 620. 
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Rules that fail the test of generality, for example violating natural justice, are, 
in fact, failing a test—they are to be judged flawed because they undermine the 
legal system.36 Moreover, the very existence of the rule of recognition, hence 
of the rule of law, for Hart depends on judges recognizing and enforcing 
among themselves a “common standard of correct judicial decision.”37 Lacking 
such commonality (and it would appear, though Hart never says so, a 
recognition by judges of their moral duty to maintain it),38 citizens would face 
“chaos” amid the loss of consistent judicial orders.39 
David Dyzenhaus has claimed that Hart’s reasoning reduces judges under 
immoral legal systems to “cog[s] in a vicious administrative regime.”40 Still, as 
Dyzenhaus concedes, Hart argues that judges should use the considerable 
discretion afforded by the open texture of law to serve policy ends deemed 
just.41 It remains relevant, here, that the kind of reasoning for which Hart calls 
in discretionary judicial decision making is, by his own account, not legal.42 
Moral questions, for Hart, are policy questions, into which a judge may, even 
should, enter.43 But they are not legal questions; they do not provide legal 
criteria by which to analyze and evaluate law.44 That said, at least among the 
juridical elites, morals are to guide legal actors in two ways: in urging them to 
maintain the rule of law, and in guiding them in using their discretion to 
instantiate the proper moral policies.45 That is, where the law does not dictate a 
particular outcome, Hart’s judge, within the constraints of the law as it is, 
should interstitially legislate according to “his own beliefs and values.”46 
We see then, in Hart’s soft positivism, at least, a moral imperative behind 
the rule of law and moral duties assigned to legal elites. The question remains 
whether morality is or should be, despite Hart’s separability thesis, an essential 
element in law itself, and if so in what ways. I leave this further question for 
Part III, first turning to the contrasting view of law and morality underlying 
natural law reasoning. 
 
 36. HART, supra note 3, at 115–16. 
 37. Id. at 116. 
 38. See id. at 146. I would note, here, Hart’s statement, that a generalized refusal on the part 
of judges to abide by the rule of recognition “would be treated by a preponderant majority as a 
subject of serious criticism and as wrong” and would constitute a change of regime. Id. 
 39. Id. at 116. 
 40. David Dyzenhaus, The Grudge Informer Case Revisited, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1000, 1017 
(2008). 
 41. Id. at 1023. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. 
 45. HART, supra note 3, at 273. 
 46. Id. 
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II.  NATURAL LAW: NOT JUST JUSTICE 
At the other end of the spectrum from legal positivism regarding morality 
and the rule of law is “thick” modern natural law reasoning. This modern 
natural law, with its roots in the thought of Immanuel Kant and the demand 
that individual autonomy be assured through legal means, is quite rigorous in 
juridical terms; those subscribing to this view demand that only truly just 
ruling directives be recognized as laws, and even that societies be transformed 
to make the rule of law meaningful.47 There is, for example, the statement of 
the Delhi Congress of the International Commission of Jurists, which declared 
that the concept of the rule of law “should be employed not only to safeguard 
and advance the civil and political rights of the individual in a free society, but 
also to establish social, economic, educational and cultural conditions under 
which his legitimate aspirations and dignity may be realised.”48 
Joseph Raz has criticized this statement for identifying the rule of law with 
popular political ideals, at the same time seeming to take in all moral concerns: 
  If the rule of law is the rule of good law then to explain its nature is to 
propound a complete social philosophy. But if so the term lacks any useful 
function. We have no need to be converted to the rule of law just in order to 
discover that to believe in it is to believe that good should triumph.49 
If “law” means moral “goodness” then the term seems to add nothing to our 
understanding of either morality or law. 
Of course this extreme, easily caricatured, version of natural law is not the 
only one available. Rather than produce, here, a taxonomy of natural laws, I 
will examine in detail the traditional form of natural law represented by 
thinkers such as Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. I do so because, as I will show 
in Part V, this form of natural law provides the most radical contrast to the 
goals and assumptions of positivism while at the same time providing the 
necessary moral element found in both modern positivism and modern natural 
law. 
Traditional natural law assumes that people, being rational creatures, are 
capable of recognizing (though not predestined to recognize) the structure or 
order of reality and, within limits, to guide their conduct in accordance with 
that structure.50 The basic, universal precepts to be followed in seeking to act 
in this way may be called “natural law”; more importantly, for our purposes, 
 
 47. HEINRICH A. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW 88–90 (Thomas R. Hanley trans., 1998). 
See also RUSSELL HITTINGER, A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW NATURAL LAW THEORY (1987).  I leave 
aside, for current purposes, the “New Natural Law” theory propounded by John Finnis and his 
followers. 
 48. T.R.S. ALLAN, LAW, LIBERTY, AND JUSTICE: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 26 n.3 (1993). 
 49. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 211 (1979). 
 50. ROMMEN, supra note 47, at 11. 
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they dictate action that properly can be called “virtuous.”51 In narrow terms 
virtue simply means “excellence”; more generally, one who is virtuous acts as 
one ought, meeting standards of good or right conduct derived from the 
rational nature of reality (“right reason”) and the nature of the person as a 
rational being.52 
Traditional natural law is grounded in a specific understanding of both law 
and the person as intrinsically oriented toward action in accordance with the 
natural order.53 On this view, law properly embodies natural standards of 
excellence or virtue.54 The person is at his or her best, and improved, when 
acting in accord with natural goods (such as honesty, justice, and love), and 
law serves its natural function, moving toward its proper end, when it 
encourages virtue and discourages vice.55 
Traditional natural law theories are in disrepute among academics on 
account of their violating contemporary assertions of our inevitable uncertainty 
concerning the nature of being and of the good—and therefore of the 
substantive (or “policy”) goals of law.56 Traditional natural law also is 
problematic for contemporary critics in that it goes against the widespread 
conviction that one cannot derive an “ought” regarding moral conduct from the 
“is” of the way reality or some aspect thereof happens to be structured.57 Hart 
finds natural law teleology in particular “somewhat comic” and easy to 
caricature.58 Hart criticizes the natural law view that the person has both a 
nature and a natural end because in his view it ignores the reality of human 
choice—that what makes a possible, particular end a person’s end is that 
person’s choosing it as such.59 That is, for Hart, a goal such as wisdom 
becomes my end because I choose to pursue it, not because wisdom is by 
nature the proper end I will pursue if not corrupted by, say, the vice of greed or 
sloth. As important, for Hart, is that traditional natural law inappropriately 
supplements what he deems the obvious, because almost universal, good of 
survival with other, supposedly higher ends such as cultivation of the 
 
 51. Id. at 172. 
 52. Id. at 19. 
 53. FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS: A SOURCEBOOK IN CHRISTIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 
(Oliver O’Donovan & Joan Lockwood O’Donovan eds., 1999). 
 54. Id. at 299. 
 55. ROMMEN, supra note 47, at 19. 
 56. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 118–19 
(2004). 
 57. Hart, supra note 23, at 1285–86. 
 58. HART, supra note 3, at 189–90. This blanket objection to a teleological understanding of 
law (and of being itself) has produced an ironic situation in which seemingly any argument for 
judging laws in moral terms in recent decades has been labeled “natural law.” ROMMEN, supra 
note 47, at 172 (thus my references to “modern natural law”). 
 59. HART, supra note 3, at 190. 
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intellect.60 Our almost universal desire for the good of survival is enough, for 
Hart, to explain even the need to reject iniquitous laws because, as he quotes 
Hume, “Human nature cannot by any means subsist without the association of 
individuals; and that association never could have place were no regard paid to 
the laws of equity and justice.”61 
The most important problem with traditional natural law, in contemporary 
terms, is that it seeks a substantive good—usually defined as the common 
good, bound up with the dignity of the person, and this requires that the law 
reform vice and encourage virtue.62 The fear is that natural law demands that 
the government dictate a specific code of conduct, punishing all deviations 
from it. The result, on this view, would be a violation of personal privacy and 
demands for strict religious observance, sexual morality, and the like.63 
Like all substantive goals, natural law conceptions of the common good 
may lead to overbearing moral, political, and legal demands. Natural law rests 
on the claim that there is an objective, knowable order to reality and that action 
in accordance with that order is morally good.64 Law, as a central regulatory 
institution for social life, is necessary in this pursuit, properly (that is, 
according to its true nature) helping people achieve the good by upholding and 
encouraging justice; indeed, it has often been said that, according to natural 
law, “an unjust law is no law at all.”65 
But traditional natural law is neither so rigid nor so confident in law’s 
power to produce virtue, as its critics appear to believe. Perhaps most 
important, a more proper rendering of the natural law view of unjust laws 
would be that “that which is not just seems to be no law at all.”66 In thus 
quoting Augustine, Aquinas in the Summa Theologica explains that “the force 
of a law depends on the extent of its justice.”67 That is, law is not simply just or 
unjust, law or not law. Rather, a law may be more or less just: “[E]very human 
law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of 
nature.”68 Law’s nature is just—in accord with the law of nature, but that 
 
 60. Id. at 191. 
 61. Id. 
 62. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, THE REPUBLIC AND THE LAWS ix (Niall Rudd trans., 1998). 
 63. William N. Eskridge, The Marriage Cases—Reversing the Burden of Inertia in a 
Pluralist Constitutional Democracy, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1785, 1790 (2009). 
 64. ROMMEN, supra note 47, at 20. 
 65. O’Donovan & O’Donovan, supra note 53, at 113. 
 66. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. I-II, Q. 95, Art. 2 (Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947), available at http://www.ccel.org/ 
ccel/aquinas/summa.toc.html (quoting Augustine: “non videtur esse lex, quae iusta non fuerit”). 
 67. Id. (“inquantum habet de iustitia, intantum habet de virtute legis”). 
 68. Id. (“omnis lex humanitus posita intantum habet de ratione legis, inquantum a lege 
naturae derivatur”). 
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nature can be diluted by elements that are unjust because derived from 
improper precepts or goals. 
Aquinas may be seen as giving an absolute twist to this last statement 
when he follows it with the further comment that “if in any point [the law] 
deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.”69 
But two things merit our attention, here. First, where the standard, Dominican 
translation here reads “perversion,” the Latin word is “corruptum”—a word 
more literally translated as “corruption.” Corruption denotes more clearly than 
perversion the sense in which the deflection from natural law mixes injustice 
into the intrinsic justice of law, bringing us back to the matter of degrees of 
justice and injustice.70 Alternatively, if one chooses to maintain “perversion” 
as Aquinas’s meaning, even here we see the sense in which the extent of the 
law’s disagreement with the natural law moves that law from its true course—
either more or less far from its natural target depending on the extent of the 
deflection.71 Second, “deflects from” is not, in actuality, a literal translation of 
the Latin term, discordet, which might be taken to mean “is discordant with” or 
“disagrees with.” But “discordant with” maintains the sense of deviation from, 
and other translations also pick up on the sense in which an unjust law misses 
the mark of justice—with some laws coming closer to that mark than others. 
For example, one translation not irrationally renders Aquinas’s Latin “[a] 
tyrannical law is not according to reason, and therefore is not straightforwardly 
a law, but rather a sort of crooked law.”72 “Crooked,” here, captures the 
practical sense in which a bad law is malformed and hence ill suited to its 
purpose. In any of these cases, the law is not purely bad on account of its 
failure to fully derive its points from the natural law; it is only bad, unjust, 
corrupt or perverse to the extent that it is improperly derived from right 
reason.73 
 
 69. Id. (“Si vero in aliquo, a lege naturali discordet, iam non erit lex sed legis corruptio.”). 
 70. See id. at pt. I-II, Q. 94, Art. 5. It is relevant, here, that the Dominican translation also 
uses “perversion” as a translation of “corruptio” where Aquinas observes that the written law may 
be said to be given “for the correction of the natural law” “because the natural law was perverted 
in the hearts of some men, as to certain matters, so that they esteemed those things good which 
are naturally evil; which perversion stood in need of correction.” In the Latin: “Ad primum ergo 
dicendum quod lex scripta dicitur esse data ad correctionem legis naturae, vel quia per legem 
scriptam suppletum est quod legi naturae deerat, vel quia lex naturae in aliquorum cordibus, 
quantum ad aliqua, corrupta erat intantum ut existimarent esse bona quae naturaliter sunt mala; et 
talis corruptio correctione indigebat.” 
 71. AQUINAS, supra note 66, at pt. I-II, Q. 92, Art. 1. It is interesting to note, here, Aquinas 
uses the word “perversitas” in a highly similar context, showing the affinity of the two terms for 
laws deflected from the law of nature. 
 72. O’Donovan & O’Donovan, supra note 53, at 345. 
 73. AQUINAS, supra note 66, at pt. I-II, Q. 93, Art. 3 (“Human law has the nature of law in 
so far as it partakes of right reason; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is derived from the 
eternal law. But in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, 
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Some laws have no justice at all, and therefore are not law. Aquinas refers 
to “tyrannical government, which is altogether corrupt, and which, therefore, 
has no corresponding law.”74 But most laws and regimes are not altogether 
corrupt. Aquinas notes that laws may be unjust “by being contrary to human 
good,” imposing excessive burdens for the good only of the rulers, or being 
imposed by those without authority to do so.75 He then states that “[t]he like 
are acts of violence rather than laws.”76 But, again, we should not be too quick 
to take this as an absolute formulation of law versus non-law. The Latin here 
is, “Et huiusmodi magis sunt violentiae quam leges.” A literal translation of 
this sentence would be, “And such things are more acts of violence than laws.” 
That is, we have here, again, the notion of quantity or proportion of more or 
less justice and injustice, translating into a law that is more or less aberrant. 
Moreover, even laws that definitively are unjust still may bind our conscience, 
according to Aquinas, because the individual himself or herself has a duty to 
act in a just manner in regard to the social ends of a system of law (that is, the 
rule of law), taking into account the possibility of scandal or tumult potentially 
caused by disobedience.77 Thus, at least for Aquinas, law exists on a 
continuum from just to unjust, true to perverse or crooked, pure to corrupt, as 
does the individual’s response to that law—and as does the law, taken as an 
overall system, or rule of law (such as the non-law of tyranny). 
As not all “bad” laws should be ignored, so not all possible “good” laws 
should be promulgated. Prudence is necessary to shape laws that will serve 
their proper, universal end of promoting virtue in the context of a particular 
people’s habits, beliefs, and circumstances. For example, Aquinas specifically 
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rejected the notion that the state can or should outlaw prostitution.78 Such laws, 
Aquinas reasoned, citing Augustine, would succeed only in undermining other 
important relations and public goods through enforcement efforts and their 
unintended consequences.79 
Thus, at the least, there is room within traditional natural law theory for 
much disagreement over what particular laws are necessary or beneficial to 
achieve the common good.80 All natural law can provide is a mode of 
reasoning—including philosophical precepts of “right reason” and a 
conception of prudence rooted in recognition of a moral common good. Jurists, 
legislators, and citizens may choose whether to use this mode of reasoning in 
evaluating the extent of justice and legitimacy possessed by laws and proposed 
laws. 
It remains the case that, in contemporary terms, traditional natural law is 
dangerous on account of its attachment to a specific account of the good—the 
life of virtue.81 It would be wrong to claim, however, that modern theorists do 
not demand a specific set of structures and policies—in the name of justice and 
the rule of law, but also as constituting a substantive good. As will be argued in 
the next section, modern theories, whether positivistic or moralistic, simply 
choose a particular “thin” goal of law, namely autonomy. 
III.  AUTONOMY AS THE MORALITY OF MODERN LAW 
Morality remains at the heart, or at least the root, of our legal discourse. It 
is the vocabulary of moral discourse that has lain in disrepute for some time. 
Hart famously refused to put forward any “moral” good as the proper end of 
the rule of law.82 Rather, Hart argued, the rule of law should be seen as merely 
allowing for establishment and maintenance of the minimum level of peace 
and stability necessary for each of us to pursue our own ends while living in 
common with our fellows.83 But Hart’s demands of law are in fact extensive 
and moralistic. In discussing the view that certain enactments of the Nazi 
regime were too unjust to be treated as law, Hart opines that, whereas the 
Germans had allowed positivist views of law to take on a “sinister character,” 
in English history the view that “law is law” in fact went along with the most 
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enlightened “liberal attitudes."84 In the more enlightened, “truly liberal” 
English tradition, according to Hart, it was well known that something’s being 
the law does not determine whether it should be obeyed; rather, the morality of 
the law would determine whether it should be obeyed.85 
Far from rendering laws self-justifying, then, Hart’s theory sets up a very 
high moral bar for law’s legitimacy—though one rooted in a particular 
(English liberal) set of cultural habits and values. Hart’s most explicit and 
extensive elaboration of this position appears in Law, Liberty, and Morality, a 
book in which he argues that “the use of legal coercion by any society calls for 
justification as something prima facie objectionable to be tolerated only for the 
sake of some countervailing good.”86 Laws exert power—they not only punish 
those who violate them, but also restrain those who obey them.87 This means 
that they inflict “a special form of suffering—often very acute—on those 
whose desires are frustrated by the fear of punishment.”88 That is, Hart held a 
quintessentially liberal conception of the good as relatively unconstrained 
autonomy, with this good being dictated by the freedom-loving nature of the 
person. Hart’s basic level of peace may be seen as moral in the sense that it is a 
common good to be desired and pursued because it makes possible a good life 
for human persons—a life of autonomous individual flourishing. 
It is because they refuse to posit a more concrete, substantive end that 
modern theorists claim to be maintaining a separation between law and 
morality. Refusing to identify any one good or good life for persons, they seem 
to believe, they are leaving us to pursue our own desires as free, autonomous 
selves.89 That the life of individual choice and pursuit of self-chosen goods is 
itself a kind of good life, requiring specific social structures and both 
demanding and ruling out many kinds of activities has been pointed out many 
times.90 As important, all such theories require that people act with at least a 
kind of virtue, such as, for example, emotional independence.91 Moreover, this 
virtue cannot be merely individual; it requires social expression and social 
institutions, including some corresponding version of the rule of law. 
Most moralistic (modern “natural law”) and non-moralistic (“positivistic”) 
legal theorists today share a common moral goal: autonomy. To prioritize 
individual autonomy is to posit a common good and demand that society be 
structured for its promotion. We see this, for example, in contemporary 
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marriage law, which allows either spouse to demand a unilateral “no-fault” 
divorce, prioritizing the autonomy of the departing spouse over the other 
spouse’s desire for community and stability.92 Autonomy in the sense of self-
actualization and self-definition is taken as a metaphysical highest good (or 
right), ordering other, lesser goods (or rights). As the U.S. Supreme Court 
mused in its decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey: “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”93 We 
can and should, on this view, define and choose the nature and meaning of our 
own existence. And the Constitution, which is interpreted principally as a 
protection for individual liberty, must uphold this choice making by forbidding 
laws that might intrude thereon.94 
Thus, there appears to be at least one knowable common good for modern 
legal theorists: maximum individual autonomy. Moreover, this moral good is 
found through implicit rejection of the fact/value distinction. To prioritize 
individual autonomy is to derive the “ought” of choice maximization from the 
“is” of the capacity to make free choices. Because we are capable of making 
choices relatively unconstrained by history and tradition, as well as external 
coercion, does not necessarily mean that we ought to exercise that capability to 
its full extent, or that it should be respected as such by the state. Only if we 
assume that choice making is central to our nature—our essence, as it were—
can such a view make sense. In other words, the justification for individual 
autonomy is moral at its core. Human flourishing may be recognized all but 
universally as a good, but again this recognition is an “is” not an “ought” and, 
as important, to claim that human flourishing requires individual autonomy is 
to make a claim about the nature of the person and our moral duty to act in 
accordance with that nature.95 
Hart, of course, states his moral convictions as mere observations, but the 
result is extremely close, at least, to an argument that human nature demands 
that law incorporate respect for human dignity. For example, Hart reflects that 
“so deeply embedded in modern man is the principle that prima facie human 
beings are entitled to be treated alike that almost universally where the laws do 
discriminate by reference to such matters as colour and race, lip-service at least 
is still widely paid to this principle.”96 Ironically, Hart’s descriptive 
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methodology ends up rendering his arguments all the closer to a grounding of 
both law and morals in human nature: 
[T]he social morality of societies which have reached the state where this can 
be distinguished from its law, always includes certain obligations and duties, 
requiring the sacrifice of private inclination or interest which is essential to the 
survival of any society, so long as men and the world in which they live retain 
some of their most familiar and obvious characteristics.97 
Further, without basic rules, for example restricting free use of violence 
and requiring certain forms of fair dealing, “we should be doubtful of the 
description of the group as a society, and certain that it could not endure for 
long.”98 The implication is clear, including to Hart, that “in all communities 
there is a partial overlap in content between legal and moral obligation.”99 
IV.  “EPISTEMIC” LEGAL MORALITY 
In pointing out the moral element in all but the most reductionist versions 
of the rule of law, this Article is not intended to engage in some meaningless 
game of “gotcha.” Nor is it intended to argue for any all-encompassing, 
utopian moral theory. Rather, the point is that attempts to “de-moralize” the 
rule of law, understandable as they are in the face of social philosophies 
masquerading as jurisprudence, miss the (limited) nature of specifically legal 
morality. Such attempts thus obscure the rule of law’s moral nature and the 
sense in which it is necessary for any reasonable social order and, hence, for 
even a moderate opportunity for human flourishing. 
Of course, it may be argued that only a caricatured view of legal positivism 
ignores morality, and that more sophisticated contemporary philosophies of 
law recognize the relevance of individual moral standards to law, while 
seeking to limit their capacity to undermine public peace, or, in Rawls’s terms, 
the “overlapping consensus” crucial to the survival of liberal democracy.100 
Rawls’s highly influential explication of the rule of law seeks to abstract 
political justice (and hence legal legitimacy) from particular conceptions of the 
good. His theory is rooted specifically in political liberalism, a structure itself 
committed to gaining “the support of an overlapping consensus of reasonable 
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines in a society regulated by” Rawls’s 
political conception of justice.101 His goal is a system in which “citizens, who 
remain deeply divided on religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines, can 
still maintain a just and stable democratic society.”102 And such a society 
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requires that “citizens’ reasoning in the public forum about constitutional 
essentials and basic questions of justice [be] guided by a political conception 
the principles and values of which all citizens can endorse.”103 
Such rational principles constitute “public reason” and demand that 
religious reasons and faith claims, as well as all systemic conceptions of the 
good that cannot be explained in terms accessible to people holding different 
moral values, be left outside the public square.104 The influence of Rawlsian-
style public reason on jurisprudence is made clear in recent substantive due 
process decisions. Legislative and judicial judgments must not be “arbitrary 
and capricious” but rather must be supported by a reasonable legal basis.105 
Laws, if they are to be upheld within our liberal democratic system, must be 
justified by public reasons. To be deemed in accordance with our fundamental 
rights and hence just, a law must make only minimal impositions on individual 
moral choice, such that all rational citizens would say that the law is consistent 
with their own freedom and equality.106 This is not surprising, given the 
primacy of liberty in Rawls’s theory.107 
As a result of this form of reasoning, individual autonomy is taken as a 
fundamental, grounding ideal (one might say a grundnorm), the implications of 
which are to be unpacked by judges, but the further bases of which are not 
open to question.108 This point is further heightened by arguments in favor of 
public reason grounding its justification in liberal democracy itself. As one 
commentator argues: “A liberal state exists in good part to accommodate a 
variety of people irrespective of their special preference for one kind of life 
over another.”109 Overlapping consensus is portrayed as the raison d’etre of 
liberal democracy. And this means that to question the validity of public reason 
is to question the legitimacy of liberal democracy itself. 
A view that grounds the legitimacy of public reason and autonomy on their 
being essential to liberal democracy seems problematic in an era in which 
liberal democracy itself has been portrayed as dangerous to the rights of non-
Western peoples.110 Failing to justify liberal democracy’s fundamental 
principle seems as politically unwise as it is philosophically unsatisfying in an 
era of cultural and political conflict. Moreover, Rawlsian public reason fails to 
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provide criteria by which we may judge, domestically, concrete burdens on 
individual liberty either legitimate or illegitimate.111 “Mere overlapping 
consensus with respect to a general rational conception of justice as fairness,” 
with fairness defined as liberty’s being restrained only “by the naked 
‘categorial’ demands of public reason,” is “vacuous as a standard for devising 
any actual, concrete public order.”112 This is so because “any rational principle 
that could be forwarded as a valid specific limitation of autonomy” would be 
dismissed as a comprehensive, idiosyncratic view of what is good or bad, 
hence violating “the demands of public reason.”113 
Rawls, then, ends by prioritizing his good (autonomy) over any concrete 
theory of the just because his good can be limited only by itself. That is, 
autonomy can only be limited when and to the extent it impedes autonomy.114 
Rawls’s autonomy, the value of which he does not justify save to say that its 
undue restraint would be unjust, ends up trumping—even ruling out—full legal 
reasoning. 
How, then, are modern legal theorists to explain liberal democracy as a 
legal system without recourse to morality as its essential and pervasive 
motivating principle? One response to Rawls’s problem has been further 
elaboration of epistemic analysis—or further unpacking of what we mean by 
the term “law”—in an attempt to flesh out the implications of legal norms. 
Such an approach is, of course, in keeping with Hart’s stated concern to define 
rather than morally justify law and legal systems. I will take one example 
here—that of Michael Neumann—not because it is the best known, but 
because it provides a particularly thorough treatment of the implications of an 
epistemic understanding of law and thus provides a full view of its inevitable 
moral presumptions. 
Neumann defines laws as rules addressed to intelligent beings.115 Thus, a 
rule that leaves people without the power to choose (autonomously) whether to 
obey or disobey (that is, one the sanctions of which are unavoidable) violates 
the rule of law.116 Neumann claims this is an epistemic rather than a moral 
distinction.117 That is, he claims that laws violating his principles, whether 
moral or not, simply do not meet the definition of law.118 In arguing that his is 
a non-moral vision of law, Neumann points out that the substance of laws 
meeting his “avoidability” criterion still may be immoral—may, for example, 
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deny people liberal rights and freedoms.119 But autonomy is a deeper, more 
fundamental moral value than even the liberal rights, such as freedom of 
speech, that it supports. And Neumann’s commitment to this autonomy is built 
into his rule of law through his definition of constraints. A purported law, the 
sanctions of which are unavoidable (for example, a law imposing the death 
penalty for walking on one’s feet rather than one’s hands), is not a law, 
according to Neumann; it is simply an imposition of punishment.120 Of course, 
many laws impose constraints that we cannot avoid if we wish to avoid 
penalties. For example, a provision that “walking on the grass in Central Park 
will result in a fine” constrains us from walking on the grass in Central Park, 
lest we be fined. But this does not necessarily undermine the provision’s status 
as law. Indeed, laws inevitably constrain individual autonomy. According to 
Neumann, however, at some point constraints become uncomfortable or 
dehumanizing enough to constitute punishments.121 According to this view, 
rules imposing excessive restraints (“drink ditch water or die,” for example) 
should be seen, in essence, as punishments imposed without actual law (that is, 
a rule one may choose to obey or disobey). Neumann would seem, then, to be 
making a distinction between acceptable laws and unacceptable (in this case 
“imposing excessive unavoidable constraints”) non-laws—more in keeping 
with the understanding of natural law critiqued here than with any form of 
positivism. 
Neumann would consider such a charge inaccurate because his rule of law 
is violated only by punishing constraints that are both unavoidable and non-
universal. A law requiring that all persons, without distinction, drink ditch 
water, though dehumanizing and hence immoral, would meet the demands of 
Neumann’s rule of law.122 Thus, Neumann somewhat surreptitiously 
introduces another primary moral value—equality—into his definition of the 
rule of law. To demand that everyone drink ditch water on pain of death is 
dehumanizing. But if the law is promulgated properly and is universal in 
scope, Neumann argues, it remains in accord with the rule of law. Only if some 
people are excused from suffering—the unavoidable punishment of drinking 
ditch water—is the law not a law.123 
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This is not to say that for Neumann equality must be enforced perfectly in 
all laws if they are to meet the rule of law; he allows for corruption and even 
class-based differences in the administration of justice and punishment, 
provided both predictability and the general applicability of law are 
maintained.124 That is, at some point, corruption and class-based distinctions 
will eviscerate the law by making it apply only to those less favored.125 The 
core distinction, here, is one of race versus class. That is, on Neumann’s 
reasoning, income levels can be said to exist on account of some direct or 
indirect form of chosen conduct, whereas race cannot. Hence, constraints 
placed on race are unavoidable whereas those based on class are not.126 
Many would reject Neumann’s drawing of the line between avoidable and 
unavoidable distinctions. Particularly problematic for many would be the 
class/race distinction as regards those brought up in disadvantageous 
surroundings. Rawls, for example, rejects the ownership by persons of their 
talents, abilities, and even character, thus imposing a principle of fundamental 
material equality as integral to justice.127 But if one accepts Neumann’s view 
of chosen conduct as a justification for distinctions, then it would appear that 
only distinctions based on non-universal, unavoidable criteria (such as race) lie 
outside the definition of the rule of law.128 
Non-universal and unavoidable constraints violate Neumann’s criteria for 
the rule of law because they punish people for something they cannot help but 
“do”—that is, “be” African American, Hispanic, Caucasian, or whatever race 
or other unavoidable category may be involved.129 Given Neumann’s valuation 
of autonomy and equality, this argument makes sense,130 but it clearly is a 
moral, not an epistemic argument. A constraint (such as a rule requiring all 
persons of one category to drink only ditch water, on pain of death) clearly 
may be morally evil, as a violation of human dignity. But what makes it “not 
law”? For Neumann, it is not the (immoral) dehumanizing impact of being 
forced to drink ditch water, nor is it the epistemic consequence of 
categorization in and of itself (he defends many such categorizations as 
necessary for the public good).131 Rather, it is the combination of the 
dehumanizing effect of the unavoidable conduct (serious enough for Neumann 
to deem it a punishment) and the dehumanizing effect of a law that punishes 
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some, but not all, people on account of something they cannot help but do (or 
be)—an objection itself rooted in the value of autonomy (choice) as well as 
equality. 
Neumann’s rule of law is clearly and intimately bound up with his 
conception of human dignity. Non-universal rules that impose unavoidable 
punishments are simply too dehumanizing for him to denote as laws.132 He 
makes the moral nature of his viewpoint clear by explaining how a society 
under the rule of law achieves the status of a “civilization.”133 It does so by 
treating all its citizens “like persons whose conduct is to be regulated by 
mutually understood arrangements, not like dumb mute things to be worked 
on.”134 
Agreeing with Neumann’s sentiments, it is necessary to point out that his 
reasoning is irreducibly moral. Neumann’s criteria for law are met within a 
civilization that embodies, in part through its laws, respect for the dignity of all 
persons as equal, autonomous selves.135 Instructive here is Neumann’s own 
critique of Joseph Raz, another theorist claiming to operate on non-moral 
ground.136 Neumann rightly criticizes Raz for claiming to proffer a “thin” 
theory of the rule of law while including within it, as an essential feature, 
observation of “the principles of natural justice.”137 This demand for “natural 
justice” undermines Raz’s claim to be forwarding no moral theory as to the 
purpose of the rule of law. How so? Raz claims to be demanding only correct 
application of the law, and that only out of concern that law provide 
predictability.138 But such predictability can be provided by incorrect or even 
arbitrary application of the law—so long as it is predictable. If all the rule of 
law intends, by nature, to accomplish is the predictable direction of human 
action through rules, those rules need not be applied with substantial fairness, 
but only with consistency—all people with red hair may always lose in court, 
and will be able to plan accordingly. A tyrant can maintain the rule of law, 
even if he or she applies the law badly, so long as his or her subjects have 
predictable (not fair or correct) guidance as to what is demanded of them.139 
What is missing in such a rule is not law, but justice; as Hart recognized, such 
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a rule will undermine the rule of law, but does not, in itself, mean that it does 
not exist as law.140 
Thus, there is even in the demand for procedural accuracy (and especially 
fairness) a demand for a kind of legal goodness or virtue.141 Neumann rejects 
Raz’s conception of natural justice as unnecessary for the rule of law,142 but he 
insists on predictability and avoidability/universality.143 In this way, he 
imposes a requirement that, while a law’s particular goal may be immoral, its 
formulation must embody or evince a certain virtue or morality if it is to be law 
at all. 
Neumann’s (and Rawls’s) commitment to building into the law his 
essential goods of equality and autonomy without admitting their moral nature 
thus leads him to a familiar category mistake: that of “morally good law” for 
law, simpliciter.144 It is simply incorrect to deny that the rule of law allows for 
unequal laws including, alas, race-based categories, or that it may include laws 
that impose restrictions that are so severe, immoral, and unjust as to be 
categorized as punishments by Neumann (and perhaps others). Bad, corrupt or 
perverse laws nonetheless are laws so long as, and to the extent that, they bear 
a resemblance to, or take the form of, law. 
V.  RECONSIDERING LAW: CONSIDERING LEGAL VIRTUE 
This Part argues that law, particularly when viewed at the systemic level, 
as the rule of law, contains an irreducible, essential moral element. Law must 
have an internal, intrinsic virtue if it is to be coherent and serve its function. 
That is, unless laws are formed properly, they will not provide predictable 
order. Moreover, as will be argued, the pursuit of some goals (such as mass 
murder) is intrinsically insusceptible to law. As important, conceptually, is that 
law exists on a spectrum. Both laws that are ill-formed—that is, fail to provide 
predictable rules—and those imposing unjust categories and unjust constraints 
are corrupt or perverse. They undermine the proper goal of law, which is the 
maintenance of social order through rational rules.145 And they do so more or 
less severely according to how well or ill made they are, and how well or ill 
chosen their particular goals may be. 
Laws, properly so called, are characterized by a kind of internal virtue or 
morality.146 This virtue is efficacious in that it enables laws to serve their ends; 
 
 140. Hart, supra note 13, at 624. 
 141. NEUMANN, supra note 94, at 12. 
 142. Id. at 10. 
 143. Id. at 11, 27. 
 144. Id. at 58. 
 145. Kristen Rundle, The Impossibility of Exterminatory Legality: Law and the Holocaust, 59 
U. TORONTO L.J. 65, 89 (2009). 
 146. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 47 (1964). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
488 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:467 
it is moral in the sense that it recognizes the dignity of the human person as 
subject only to rules that have been properly formed and enacted—itself a 
moral good.147 And while this internal morality does not necessarily entail 
specific moral goals, it nonetheless, on the whole, shapes the law toward 
external morality as well. Aquinas termed law “a dictate of practical 
reason”;148 thus it is, in an important sense, a tool for ends outside itself. But 
this tool is implicated by morality in that it must have its own, internal virtue if 
it is to serve properly its ends, and the more general ends of the rule of law. 
Lon Fuller was perhaps the most famous exponent of the view that a legal 
system, if it is to be such in anything but name, must meet a set of criteria that 
constitute an internal morality.149 That is, for Fuller the rule of law requires 
that laws be characterized by a set of virtues, and these virtues are distinct from 
the substantive criteria of morality embedded in most natural law systems, 
which demand that laws encourage virtue and discourage vice in the people. 
Fuller thus distinguished between a natural law of institutions and procedures 
and a natural law of substantive aims. 
Fuller summarizes the procedural law of nature in terms of criteria meant 
to guide law making to meet the requirements of the rule of law.150 These 
criteria can be summed up in eight canons: there must be general rules; the 
rules must be promulgated; the rules must typically be prospective, rather than 
retroactive; the rules must be clear; the rules must not require contradictory 
actions; the rules must not require actions that are impossible to perform; the 
rules must remain relatively constant over time; and there must be a 
congruence between the rules as declared and the rules as administered.151 
Substantive natural law, on the other hand, sets criteria that are not 
necessary to and may even undermine establishment of the rule of law. Such 
criteria “might include such diverse assertions as . . . no tax can be just that 
takes from the citizen more than the equivalent of what government renders to 
him; any attempt to restrict the free sexual life of responsible adults is a 
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violation of the principle of individual freedom.”152 These criteria, which I 
have argued in Part III do not properly belong to traditional natural law, aim at 
goods external to the law. They concern goods toward which the lawmaker 
should (on some views) exert his or her efforts. They aim at the moral good 
(such as tax rates commensurate with individualized governmental benefits or 
autonomous choice in sexual conduct) of the people, not of the law itself. 
Hart recognizes the dual nature of Fuller’s schema in accepting his inner 
morality of law as accurate, though insisting that it is “compatible with very 
great iniquity.”153 Hart also seizes on Fuller’s recognition of the distinction 
between law’s internal and external morality to deny the moral character of the 
legal enterprise. On Hart’s view, Fuller’s canons concern only the efficacy of 
law. He argues that: 
[Fuller’s] insistence on classifying these principles of legality as a “morality” 
is a source of confusion both for him and his readers. . . . [T]he crucial 
objection to the designation of these principles of good legal craftsmanship as 
morality, in spite of the qualification “inner,” is that it perpetrates a confusion 
between two notions that it is vital to hold apart: the notions of purposive 
activity and morality. Poisoning is no doubt a purposive activity, and 
reflections on its purpose may show that it has its internal principles. (“Avoid 
poisons however lethal if they cause the victim to vomit,” or “Avoid poisons 
however lethal if their shape, color, or size is likely to attract notice.”) But to 
call these principles of the poisoner’s art “the morality of poisoning” would 
simply blur the distinction between the notion of efficiency for a purpose and 
those final judgments about activities and purposes with which morality in its 
various forms is concerned.154 
This charge both deserves and requires a substantive response. To begin, 
not every purposive action is equally valid or capable of being described in 
terms of virtue. Hart himself uses the term “virtue” in the limited sense of 
judges’ best practices in interpreting laws so as to maintain legal principles—
that is, of practical excellence in achieving an important end.155 This is in 
keeping with our long-held views concerning virtue; as Aristotle observed, 
“[N]ot every action or feeling admits of the mean [or virtue]. For the names of 
some automatically include baseness—for instance, spite, shamelessness, envy, 
. . . and adultery, theft, murder . . . . [T]hey themselves, not their excesses or 
deficiencies, are base.”156 We would refer to an accomplished poisoner as 
cunning or skilled, but not virtuous. 
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One might respond that Aristotle is making a moral judgment regarding 
ends being sought. But this is precisely the point. As Hart sees law’s good as 
the provision of peace and stability so as to facilitate autonomous individual 
action, so Fuller's position has been described as one in which “legal structures 
embody moral aspirations and define moral relationships.”157 Legal systems 
are defined by their animating purpose—according to Hart provision of 
stability so as to enhance autonomous choice and according to Fuller the 
impartial resolution of disputes on the basis of authoritative precepts.158 
Fuller’s point is that there is an intrinsic purpose to law—the settling of 
disputes according to rules accepted as authoritative by all—that properly 
should be seen as a moral good. A society’s common good is served, indeed 
made possible, by the rule of law. 
There is, of course, much disagreement concerning the nature and even 
existence of higher common goods (such as religious salvation, substantive 
equality, or everlasting peace).159 But there is an abiding consensus, obscured 
but not erased in contemporary debates and attested to by Neumann among 
many others, that the rule of law provides the moral good of order. Without 
order there will be no society,160 hence no social order capable of providing the 
minimal rules even Hart deems necessary for meaningful individual 
autonomous action. With order the society may be a bad one, but at the least 
the rule of law will constrain the government’s discretion in pursuing its bad 
aims, providing stability and predictability.161 
The limits of the good the rule of law can provide should come as no 
surprise given law’s intrinsically limited nature. Law is not an abstract, 
universal construct of pure mind; it is the product of craft, hence of practical 
virtue.162 The craftsman becomes good or bad by engaging well or ill in his or 
her craft.163 As a builder becomes a good or a bad builder by building well or 
badly,164 a lawmaker or judge becomes a good or bad lawmaker or interpreter 
by drafting or interpreting well or badly, developing good or bad habits in the 
crafting or interpretation of laws. Thus, Fuller notes that his canons are and 
should be implicit, resting on tacit assumptions rather than rulebook strictures 
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because good laws rest on sometimes almost instinctive readings of particular 
circumstances and requirements.165 
The virtue developed through good craftsmanship enables the craftsman to 
produce better buildings, laws, or interpretations. And those buildings, laws, or 
interpretations, because they are better constructed (more just than unjust, or 
straight than crooked), will perform their functions well: 
[E]very virtue causes its possessors to be in a good state and to perform their 
functions well. The virtue of eyes, for instance, makes the eyes and their 
functioning excellent, because it makes us see well; and similarly, the virtue of 
a horse makes the horse excellent, and thereby good at galloping, at carrying 
its rider, and at standing steady in the face of the enemy.166 
Aristotle saw law as by nature aimed at promoting virtue and suppressing 
vice; in addition, he recognized that laws would fulfill their function better or 
worse according to how well they were crafted—according to the level of 
practical virtue used in their making.167 On the other hand, as Fuller points out, 
at some point a system in which the laws are crafted improperly will no longer 
function. People cannot, for example, obey secret rules.168 
Fuller emphasizes the moral nature of the predicament faced by citizens of 
a state in which laws have been formulated in violation of his canons. For him, 
it is important to point out that the people have no obligation to follow laws 
that are excessively ill-formed. Why not? Because ill-formed, “inefficacious” 
laws fail to establish any rule that citizens can know, predict, and follow, and 
“there can be no rational ground for asserting that a man can have a moral 
obligation to obey a legal rule that does not exist, or is kept secret from him, or 
that came into existence only after he had acted.”169 Of course, the issue of 
whether a particular regime’s rules are binding must be addressed in the 
concrete and in the context of the just/unjust spectrum on which laws and legal 
systems fall. But at some point variance from one or more canons will make 
the regime unlawful because it demands what is not possible (obedience to 
unknown rules) and so punishes unjustly—that is, against moral standards of 
right conduct. 
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If the rulers fail in their essential “legal” task of establishing rules for the 
governance of human action, then the people cannot be expected to follow the 
resulting dictates, even if these dictates are called “laws.” That said, so long as 
the laws comport tolerably well with the internal morality of law—so long as 
they have the virtues of law reasonably delineated by Fuller’s canons—the 
people have a reason, and an obligation, to obey. This is true even if the people 
disagree with the policies furthered by those laws.170 Thus, discussion of legal 
efficacy is moral by nature—it attaches moral authority to rules on account of 
their concordance with human dignity—but the moral element is restricted to a 
zone defined by the intrinsic goal of law, namely order. 
VI.  EVIL LAWS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 
There may be non-legal reasons for disobeying a law that is truly evil in its 
intent and/or practice. As Aristotle noted, a decent person will be better than a 
person whose justice derives solely from being a stickler for the letter of the 
law because decency may not be captured by the law—indeed, it may be 
impossible for a rule to make for true decency given the diversity of human 
experience.171 Moral enormities, whether genocide in the literal sense or, for 
example, forcing religious groups to affirmatively violate central 
commandments of their faith,172 cannot bind the conscience, even if instituted 
through well-crafted laws. 
But the fact that these moral concerns are extra-legal limits, rather than 
eliminates, the moral element in law qua law. Law by nature aims at order, 
order cabins power, and evil demands that power be given free rein. There is 
significant historical evidence of the conflict between the internal morality of 
law and the use of law to achieve the most evil of ends. The legal institution of 
slavery undermined specific constitutional protections in a manner that 
endangered the rights of all Americans.173 The battles over due process rights 
and their sacrifice by the Fugitive Slave Laws, which in the end could only be 
enforced by putting free Africans at risk of simple kidnapping and being 
“returned” to slavery without the most basic legal procedures, were a 
significant cause of the Civil War.174 The various Black Codes of the pre-Civil 
War era attest to the impact of the drive to maintain unchecked dominion over 
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one group of people on the rights of all.175 Alabama’s Slave Code, for 
example, bound all slave owning men to regular service on patrol, carrying out 
such functions as breaking up slave assemblies, searching for escaped slaves, 
whipping slaves they deemed to have committed crimes, and searching various 
buildings and outbuildings, all including activities on and regarding the 
properties of whites and all without need for warrants.176 Later, under the 
regime of segregation, it was seen that mere law could not keep African 
Americans in their subservient position, such that lynching—extra-legal 
murders intended to instill sufficient terror to ensure obedience to unjust 
laws—became frequent.177 
Another example is provided by the original anti-Jewish laws enacted 
under the National Socialist regime. These laws clearly aimed at bad ends; the 
Nuremberg Laws (1935–1939) regulated Jewish activities in Germany, 
disenfranchising Jews and forbidding them to have marital relations with non-
Jews.178 These Nazi laws were discriminatory and punitive, but did have the 
form of law; thus their evil effects, while real and deplorable, were limited.179 
Only after Kristallnacht did the Nazis aim specifically at the extermination of 
Jews, and they did so through non-legal means.180 For example, the Star of 
David decree granted the relevant functionaries authority to employ “additional 
police measures” and “more severe punishments” against Jews at their 
discretion.181 Thus, the Nazis both aimed specifically at the most evil of ends 
(genocide) and abandoned the use of proper laws at about the same time. As 
noted by a Nazi legal bureaucrat, even the Nuremberg Laws posed an 
impediment and barrier to the extermination of the Jews because they were “an 
annoying reminder that the continuing persecution was ‘illegal.’”182 Law then, 
by nature, calls those in power to at least a minimal virtue. The call may be 
ignored, but then so is the law. 
None of this is to say that the Nuremberg Laws were not evil and worthy 
of resistance; they were. But it is too easy to dismiss as unintended 
consequences of law what are in fact the intrinsic qualities of law’s internal 
morality. Laws meeting the criteria of internal morality provide order and deny 
to the state the terrorizing power of unpredictability.183 Explicit statements of 
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abhorrent ends also tend to undermine the regime’s legitimacy—putting all the 
people on notice of the moral enormities it intends, leaving these people unable 
to claim ignorance, and making them face the reality of what is being done to 
their fellows.184 Moreover, those actually doing the injustice—for example 
murdering Jews or, in apartheid South Africa, torturing members of the 
African National Congress—operate more freely if they can do so without 
laws. Without laws, as one South African apartheid-era security official noted, 
“There are no lines drawn to mark where you cannot cross. So you can go very 
low—I mean very low—and it still doesn’t hit you.”185 Law constricts evil 
because people by nature hesitate to cross clear, legal lines even in the midst of 
committing evil acts.186 
CONCLUSION 
Morality is connected intimately to the law—both in its internal structure 
and as its aspiration or goal. Even bad laws, so long as they are characterized 
by the virtues of internal morality, restrict the practice of evil. Thus, those 
pursuing evil will destroy or nullify them if they can. What, then, does this tell 
us of the moral limits of law? For example, it would seem to follow that an 
ideal law is one that is perfectly crafted to achieve a perfect end.187 But can 
such a law exist? And if we attempt to promulgate and enforce it, would this 
require tyranny in the application? Moreover, has this article not already 
argued that to reject as “not truly law” those laws that fail to meet perfectly 
demands for internal morality, or the service of external morality, would be to 
deny to ourselves the very real good guaranteed by the rule of law—order—
and bring chaos? 
Here it is necessary to remember the nature of laws as rules. As this Article 
has sought to show, rules are not mere tools in the sense of having no moral 
import; they are an integral part of the intrinsically moral pursuit of an ordered 
social life. However, morality cannot be reduced to rules. As the internal 
morality of law must in large measure remain a set of unwritten practices, so 
the proper goals of law often lie outside the scope of rules themselves. We 
cannot lay down rules that will succeed in forcing men and women to be 
good.188 Fuller addresses this issue by distinguishing between the morality of 
aspiration (best seen in aesthetic terms, for him) and the morality of duty, for 
which law serves as the best analogy.189 
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Certainly some legal orders are better and some worse than others—the 
spectrum from just to unjust remains with us. But good, to say nothing of 
“best,” regimes are not purely the product of law. Indeed, too much reliance on 
law may undermine essential elements of a good society.190 
Thus, while some (evil) ends will destroy the internal morality of law, we 
cannot use the tool of law to achieve perfect virtue (or freedom, or any other 
moral good). We can only do our best to develop practical lawmaking and to 
interpret virtues such that the laws we make will be efficacious in spelling out 
and enforcing duties in such a way as to, perhaps, encourage people to pursue 
virtue (or virtues, whether autonomy, tolerance, or even magnanimity) in the 
other institutions of social life. In this light the pursuit of the best regime 
purely through law, and in particular through “better” interpretation and 
application of existing laws, may be seen as undermining law’s true 
function.191 This is true, not because law is merely a mindless tool, but because 
it is part of a network of understandings and goals that point outside itself. 
There is, then, no inherent, strict separation of law and morality, but neither are 
law and morality the same thing; each impacts and influences the other. Law, a 
deeply practical craft, cannot bear the full weight of morality. However, 
without the substance of moral ends it will dissipate, to be replaced by the 
desires of those with power. 
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